GREIG MASSEY, ET AL., v. R.W. GRAF, INC., ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. June 26, 2008)
Plaintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action, asking the Court to declare that building restrictions on platted parcels of property from a common grantor applied to a non-platted parcel purchased by defendants from a subsequent grantor. The Trial Court, responding to a summary judgment motion, made detailed findings of facts, and concluded that the "subject to" language in the deeds was ambiguous and construed the language against the inclusion of restrictions on any portion of the property that lay outside the platted subdivisions. Plaintiffs have appealed, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
Opinion may be found at:
Dissenting opinion may be found at:
"Because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the fundamental right of free use and enjoyment of real property, they are not favored under Tennessee law.  Restrictive covenants are strictly construed.  Any doubt concerning the applicability of a restrictive covenant will be resolved against the restriction,  and, likewise, any ambiguity in the terms of the restrictive covenant will be resolved against the restriction.  Similarly, when the terms of a covenant may be construed more than one way, the courts must resolve any ambiguities against the party seeking to enforce the restriction and in a manner which advances the unrestricted use of the property. " Id. (citations omitted).
"The language in the Warranty Deed from the Dean Estate to the University of Tennessee is as follows: “This conveyance, however, is made subject to Restrictive Covenants applicable to all of the lots located in the Deanbrook Sub-divisions of record in book of deeds 954, page 564, in the Register’s Office of Knox County, Tennessee, to which said instrument specific reference is hereby made for said conditions, limitations, reservations and restrictions.” This language is susceptible to two very different meanings. It could mean that the referenced restrictive covenants applies to all of the property conveyed including the unsubdivided tract, that included the Graf Property. Or it could mean that the Dean Estate intended to have the referenced restrictive covenants apply only to the lots within the Deanbrook subdivisions as was the original intent when the restrictions were recorded in 1954. Accordingly, we conclude that ambiguity exists." Id.
"Both the grantor and the fellow grantees whose titles contain similar restrictive covenants may enforce their reciprocal negative easement rights in either a legal or an equitable proceeding.  Grantees seeking equitable enforcement of a reciprocal negative easement must prove: (1) that the parties derived their titles from a common grantor; (2) that the common grantor had a general plan for the property involved; (3) that the common grantor intended for the restrictive covenant to benefit the property involved; and (4) that the grantees had actual or constructive knowledge of the restriction when they purchased their parcels.  Grantees seeking judicial enforcement of their negative reciprocal easement rights are not necessarily limited to the recitals in the deeds to prove their case. In addition to the deeds from the common grantor , they may also use recorded plats , or parol evidence of the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the property. " Id. (citations omitted).
"In this case, the properties known as Deanbrook Subdivision were platted with restrictions that expressly applied only to Deanbrook Subdivisions, and were recorded. The tract of land that encompassed the Dean properties adjacent to the Deanbrook Subdivisions was not platted and was not expressly included in the recorded restrictions. Further, there was no general plan or scheme of development to include the unsubdivided properties in the Deanbrook Subdivisions[.]" Id.
DISSENTING OPINION: "When I give the words in the subject language their usual and ordinary meaning – as I am required to do – I do not find the warranty deed to be ambiguous. As I understand the language at hand, it cannot be construed as being limited to the conveyed lots in the platted subdivisions. The language at issue addresses “[t]his conveyance.” The only reasonable interpretation of these two words is that they refer to the conveyed platted lots in the Deanbrook Subdivisions and the conveyed acreage outside the platted subdivisions. This is what was “convey[ed].” There can be no doubt about this." Id.