DILLARD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. HAVRON CONTRACTING CORP. ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. November 23, 2010)
The only parties left litigating in what started out as a complex construction dispute are, on one side, Dillard Construction, Inc , and, on the other, Dillard's demolition subcontractor, Havron Contracting Corp. After a bench trial and several post-trial motions, the court held that:
(1) Dillard, while not having a contract with Havron, was required by quantum meruit to pay Havron $91,100 for work performed by Havron's subcontractors;
(2) Dillard was not entitled to an offset against that judgment for damage done to electrical equipment by Havron's subcontractor;
(3) Havron was entitled to recover from Dillard, under a "passthrough" indemnity theory, the attorney's fees awarded against Havron and in favor of its subcontractor; and
(4) Havron was not entitled to recover the attorney's fees that it, Havron, incurred in defending against the claims of its subcontractor.
Dillard appeals challenging both the quantum meruit award and the denial of an offset. Havron challenges the trial court's denial of indemnification for attorney's fees Havron incurred in defending the claims of its subcontractor. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/dillardconstruction_112310.pdf
Showing posts with label quantum meruit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label quantum meruit. Show all posts
November 23, 2010
April 30, 2009
Plaintiff collaterally estopped because he was previously denied standing in a forfeiture action
GEORGE H. NASON, INDIVIDUALLY & AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHURCH STREET REALTY TRUST v. C & S HEATING, AIR, & ELECTRICAL, INC. AND O’BRIEN HEATING & AIR, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. April 30, 2009).
Plaintiff appeals summary judgment granted on claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and entitlement to quantum meruit relief. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel finding Plaintiff’s claims or rights to the same property were finally adjudicated in federal court. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/nasong_043009.pdf
”In this case, the district court found that Mr. Nason had the necessary standing under Article III but did not have the requisite statutory standing to challenge the forfeiture because he failed comply with Rule C(6) after sufficient constructive notice of the action was given. Mr. Nason’s inability to proceed as a party to the forfeiture action was a problem of his own making. Several attempts were made to personally serve Mr. Nason with notice in addition to the published notices. Despite Mr. Nason’s belief that the breach of contract claims do not arise from or relate to the forfeiture action, the time to challenge the validity of Appellees’ liens and claimed interest in the property was during the civil forfeiture action. Mr. Nason cannot now assert his position on a claim that was settled between the Appellees and the government and approved in a final order of the district court by filing a second suit, regardless of whether the first action was in rem or in personam. Examination of the previous action shows that Mr. Nason had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues he now seeks to raise but failed to timely act to use that opportunity when he failed to file an answer or statement of interest. Balancing the concerns of judicial efficiency and fairness to the parties, we find that Mr. Nason is subject to preclusion by collateral estoppel since he could have become a party to the prior litigation.” Id.
Plaintiff appeals summary judgment granted on claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and entitlement to quantum meruit relief. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel finding Plaintiff’s claims or rights to the same property were finally adjudicated in federal court. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/nasong_043009.pdf
”In this case, the district court found that Mr. Nason had the necessary standing under Article III but did not have the requisite statutory standing to challenge the forfeiture because he failed comply with Rule C(6) after sufficient constructive notice of the action was given. Mr. Nason’s inability to proceed as a party to the forfeiture action was a problem of his own making. Several attempts were made to personally serve Mr. Nason with notice in addition to the published notices. Despite Mr. Nason’s belief that the breach of contract claims do not arise from or relate to the forfeiture action, the time to challenge the validity of Appellees’ liens and claimed interest in the property was during the civil forfeiture action. Mr. Nason cannot now assert his position on a claim that was settled between the Appellees and the government and approved in a final order of the district court by filing a second suit, regardless of whether the first action was in rem or in personam. Examination of the previous action shows that Mr. Nason had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues he now seeks to raise but failed to timely act to use that opportunity when he failed to file an answer or statement of interest. Balancing the concerns of judicial efficiency and fairness to the parties, we find that Mr. Nason is subject to preclusion by collateral estoppel since he could have become a party to the prior litigation.” Id.
March 16, 2009
Court examines implied contracts, quantum meruit, promisory estoppel; good faith not actionable; construction site may not be proper venue
HERMOSA HOLDINGS, INC. f/k/a/THE MONROE PAGE GROUP v. MID-TENNESSEE BONE AND JOINT CLINIC, P.C., AMSURG, THE SURGERY CENTER OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE, et al (Tenn. Ct. App. March 16, 2009)
The Plaintiff, Hermosa Holdings, Inc., instituted the case at bar against several Defendants by asserting various causes of action with reference to a proposed medical office building development. All Defendants responded to the original complaint by filing motions to dismiss pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) and for improper venue. The Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint. The Defendants responded by filing additional motions to dismiss. By Order entered February 14, 2008, the Chancery Court of Davidson County granted the Defendant’ motions and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion can be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/hermosa_031809.pdf
The Plaintiff, Hermosa Holdings, Inc., instituted the case at bar against several Defendants by asserting various causes of action with reference to a proposed medical office building development. All Defendants responded to the original complaint by filing motions to dismiss pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) and for improper venue. The Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint. The Defendants responded by filing additional motions to dismiss. By Order entered February 14, 2008, the Chancery Court of Davidson County granted the Defendant’ motions and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion can be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/hermosa_031809.pdf
April 22, 2008
Party improving adjacent land without an express contract is awarded quantum meruit for value of materials and labor
SAMUEL DEAN WILLIAMS v. RUSSELL W. COFFEY (Tenn.Ct.App. April 21, 2008).
This case involves a dispute over the improvements made to defendant's land by plaintiff, which alleged that defendant had agreed to sell the land on which the improvements were made. The Trial Court found an implied contract between the parties and awarded plaintiff damages. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court employed the wrong measure of damages, vacate the damage award and remand for determination of damages under quantum meruit.
Opinions may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/williamss_042108.pdf
"Under Tennessee law there are two distinct types of implied contracts: contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law, which are often referred to as quasi contracts. A contract implied in fact arises under circumstances which show mutual intent of assent to contract, consideration and lawful purpose. Mutual assent may be shown by the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. [] In contrast to a contract implied in fact, “contracts implied in law are created by law without the assent of the party bound, on the basis that they are dictated by reason and justice.” [] The Supreme Court has established that a party seeking to recover on an implied contract in law or quasi contract theory must prove the following elements: (1) there is no existing, enforceable contract between the parties covering the same subject matter; (2) the party seeking recovery proves that it provided valuable goods or services; (3) the party to be charged received the goods or services; (4) the circumstances indicate that the parties to the transaction should have reasonably understood that the person providing the goods or services expected to be compensated and; (5) the circumstances demonstrate that it would be unjust for a party to retain the goods or services without payment. []" Id. (citations omitted).
"The most cogent factor for consideration regarding recovery under a quasi contract is unjust enrichment of the parties. [] A quantum meruit recovery is limited to the actual value of the goods and services received by the defendant. [] The reasonable value of services should be based on the customs and practices prevailing in the same sort of business in which the services would normally be provided. [] To prove the reasonable value of the goods and services, the party seeking to recover in quantum meruit can explain the method used to arrive at the fee or offer proof from other professionals in the same business or trade." Id. (citations omitted).
"On this theory, the case law is clear that a quantum meruit recovery must be the reasonable value of the material and labor furnished. [] The Trial Court erred in basing the plaintiff’s recovery on the increased value of defendant’s property. The Court reasoned “Damages to real estate are generally measured by the fair market value of the land immediately prior to the loss, less the fair market value immediately after the loss”. With due deference to the Trial Court, this reasoning is flawed as the property at issue was not damaged, but rather it was possibly improved by plaintiff’s services." Id. (citations omitted).
This case involves a dispute over the improvements made to defendant's land by plaintiff, which alleged that defendant had agreed to sell the land on which the improvements were made. The Trial Court found an implied contract between the parties and awarded plaintiff damages. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court employed the wrong measure of damages, vacate the damage award and remand for determination of damages under quantum meruit.
Opinions may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/williamss_042108.pdf
"Under Tennessee law there are two distinct types of implied contracts: contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law, which are often referred to as quasi contracts. A contract implied in fact arises under circumstances which show mutual intent of assent to contract, consideration and lawful purpose. Mutual assent may be shown by the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. [] In contrast to a contract implied in fact, “contracts implied in law are created by law without the assent of the party bound, on the basis that they are dictated by reason and justice.” [] The Supreme Court has established that a party seeking to recover on an implied contract in law or quasi contract theory must prove the following elements: (1) there is no existing, enforceable contract between the parties covering the same subject matter; (2) the party seeking recovery proves that it provided valuable goods or services; (3) the party to be charged received the goods or services; (4) the circumstances indicate that the parties to the transaction should have reasonably understood that the person providing the goods or services expected to be compensated and; (5) the circumstances demonstrate that it would be unjust for a party to retain the goods or services without payment. []" Id. (citations omitted).
"The most cogent factor for consideration regarding recovery under a quasi contract is unjust enrichment of the parties. [] A quantum meruit recovery is limited to the actual value of the goods and services received by the defendant. [] The reasonable value of services should be based on the customs and practices prevailing in the same sort of business in which the services would normally be provided. [] To prove the reasonable value of the goods and services, the party seeking to recover in quantum meruit can explain the method used to arrive at the fee or offer proof from other professionals in the same business or trade." Id. (citations omitted).
"On this theory, the case law is clear that a quantum meruit recovery must be the reasonable value of the material and labor furnished. [] The Trial Court erred in basing the plaintiff’s recovery on the increased value of defendant’s property. The Court reasoned “Damages to real estate are generally measured by the fair market value of the land immediately prior to the loss, less the fair market value immediately after the loss”. With due deference to the Trial Court, this reasoning is flawed as the property at issue was not damaged, but rather it was possibly improved by plaintiff’s services." Id. (citations omitted).
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