M. R. STOKES COMPANY, INC. v. MICHAEL L. SHULAR, ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. February 27, 2008).
This is a construction case. In a contract prepared by the plaintiff, contractor agreed to install sewer lines, water lines, roads and to perform certain site preparation work for a section of a subdivision development owned by the defendant-owner. The total contract price is $925,000, which includes the material and labor to complete the project. The trial court entered judgment for contractor. Owner appeals and contractor cross-appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases available at the Tennessee Bar Association website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/stokesm_022708.pdf
"It is well-settled in Tennessee that contract provisions can be waived, especially in construction projects because of the nature of construction which often require decisions to be made quickly to keep the project progressing. Moore Constr. Co. v. Clarksville Dep’t of Elect., 707 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). It is common for courts to find that “an owner has waived a written notice requirement in cases where extra work has been ordered verbally by the owner or the extra work has been performed with the owner's knowledge and without its objection.” Id. (citations omitted). The course of dealing between the parties can also amount to a waiver where the conduct of the parties makes it clear that they did not intend to rely strictly upon a contract's written notice requirement. Realty Shop, Inc. v. RR Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 601 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)." Id.
"We find that the parties “have not expressly or implicitly agreed upon a reasonable price nor have they agreed upon a practicable method of determination of price.” Accordingly, we hold that any agreement to “settle up” based upon “time and materials” at the end of the Project is unenforceable. Although we find that no enforceable contract exists, it would be inequitable for Owner to receive a windfall for the improvements Contractor made on Owner’s behalf. For that, we turn to equitable remedies. It is well settled that the theories of unjust enrichment, quasi contract, contracts implied in law, and quantum meruit are essentially the same. Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1966). Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual theory or is a contract implied-inlaw in which a court may impose a contractual obligation where one does not exist. Whitehaven Community Baptist Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Paschall's, 407 S.W.2d at 154-55). Such contracts are not based upon the intention of the parties but are obligations created by law and are “founded on the principle that a party receiving a benefit desired by him, under the circumstances rendering it inequitable to retain it without making compensation, must do so.” Paschall's, 407 S.W.2d at 154." Id.
"The Contract does not say “Contractor agrees to comply with the Standards and Specifications manual” or “agrees to pass all WHUD objective tests,” but rather that Contractor agrees to meet all White House Utility specifications. ... A plain language reading of the Contract indicates that Contractor agrees to comply with what White House Utility District specifies, whether written or not, subjective or objective. The term “specifications” is, by its nature, a broad term. Had Contractor intended to be bound to a more narrow definition, it should have drafted the Contract language accordingly. Contractor had worked with WHUD before and was aware of WHUD’s strict guidelines when drafting the Contract. The purpose of the Contract between Contractor and Owner was for Contractor, in part, to install the sewer lines for Owner so that Owner could develop an operating subdivision with plumbing that is acceptable to WHUD. Contractor did not fulfill its obligations under the Contract, and we reverse the trial court’s decision holding that Contractor did not breach its Contract with Owner." Id.
"Owner refused to pay the Contractor its final pay application, which was the retainage amount of $43,678.00. ... Our review of the record reveals that when the final pay application was submitted, Contractor had not completed its obligations under the Contract. The sewer lines had not been accepted by WHUD and a portion of the lines needed repairs. The retainage was not due until 30 days after completion. Having found that Contractor breached its Contract with Owner and did not complete its obligations under the Contract, we find that the retainage is not due to Contractor." Id.
February 27, 2008
Expert and lay testimony regarding causation, even if somewhat vague, is enough to survive summary judgment
THOMAS MORROW, ET AL. v. RONNIE BULL, ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. February 27, 2008).
The tenants, who leased a newly-constructed house from the builder/owner, sued the builder/owner alleging, among other things, that the house was negligently constructed in that it was built on a site that unreasonably exposed the house to excessive moisture and with a deficient water runoff and drainage system. The tenants sought compensation for personal injury and property damage allegedly caused by toxic mold in the house due to excessively wet basement walls. The trial court granted the builder/owner summary judgment. Upon review, we vacate the trial court's summary judgment based on our finding that genuine issues of material fact exist.
Cases available at the Tennessee Bar Association website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/morrowt_022708.pdf
"The trial court ruled that Mr. Tiano’s affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, stating that “the affidavit does not point to any one condition which did cause the mold and, therefore, deals in possibilities, not probabilities.” While Mr. Tiano’s opinion as to potential causation of the mold infestation could have been stated with more certainty, it is clearly not so vague as to be completely discounted on a summary judgment determination. We note in this regard that all nine of the possible causes identified by Mr. Tiano involve defective or insufficient construction of the house." Id.
"The combination of the expert and lay testimony clearly creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether water runoff from the school construction caused the mold growth under plaintiffs’ home, especially when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs." Id. (citing Hardaway v. Hamilton County, No. E2006-01977-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4207930, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 29, 2007)).
The tenants, who leased a newly-constructed house from the builder/owner, sued the builder/owner alleging, among other things, that the house was negligently constructed in that it was built on a site that unreasonably exposed the house to excessive moisture and with a deficient water runoff and drainage system. The tenants sought compensation for personal injury and property damage allegedly caused by toxic mold in the house due to excessively wet basement walls. The trial court granted the builder/owner summary judgment. Upon review, we vacate the trial court's summary judgment based on our finding that genuine issues of material fact exist.
Cases available at the Tennessee Bar Association website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/morrowt_022708.pdf
"The trial court ruled that Mr. Tiano’s affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, stating that “the affidavit does not point to any one condition which did cause the mold and, therefore, deals in possibilities, not probabilities.” While Mr. Tiano’s opinion as to potential causation of the mold infestation could have been stated with more certainty, it is clearly not so vague as to be completely discounted on a summary judgment determination. We note in this regard that all nine of the possible causes identified by Mr. Tiano involve defective or insufficient construction of the house." Id.
"The combination of the expert and lay testimony clearly creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether water runoff from the school construction caused the mold growth under plaintiffs’ home, especially when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs." Id. (citing Hardaway v. Hamilton County, No. E2006-01977-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4207930, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 29, 2007)).
Actual notice of restrictive covenants prevents estoppel argument, even when the covenants were not technically part of the deed
JOE GAMBRELL, ET AL. v. SONNY NIVENS, ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. February 27, 2008).
This case involves the enforcement of restrictive covenants in equity. After subdividing their property, imposing restrictions on the three lots they sold, and retaining the remaining land, vendors brought suit against remote grantees to enforce the restrictive covenants and to enjoin them from operating a wedding chapel, for commercial use, on the land.
The central issue on appeal is whether the restrictions bind the remote grantees when the covenants were listed on an undated and unsigned attachment to a deed that neither identified encumbrances nor incorporated the attached restrictions. Following a trial on the matter, the trial court permanently enjoined the commercial activity because the remote grantees took title with actual notice of the restrictions. Finding ample support for the imposition of an equitable servitude, we concur in the trial court's judgment. Affirmed and remanded.
Cases available at the Tennessee Bar Association website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/gambrellj_022708.pdf
"[T]he Nivenses had actual notice of the restrictions. Generally, factual assertions contained in a deed bind the grantor and the grantee. Duke v. Hopper, 486 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). To assert estoppel, however, a party damaged by a false factual assertion must establish (1) its lack of knowledge, without fault, of the true facts, (2) its reliance upon the false factual assertion, and (3) its consequent action based upon that untrue statement. Id. ... They could not have reasonably relied on the face of the Gambrell-Foshee deed when they had actual notice of the restrictions." Id.
"An equitable servitude is a “covenant respecting the use of land enforceable against successor owners or possessors in equity regardless of its enforceability at law.” 2 American Law of Property § 9.31 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). ... For a covenant to bind remote grantees in equity, (1) it must “touch and concern” the land; (2) the original parties to the covenant must intend that it run with the land and bind remote grantees; and (3) the remote grantee must have had notice of the covenant. Id. at *1-*2 (quoting 5 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, The Law of Real Property § 673 (1991)). To have binding effect, valid restrictions on property need not be in the chain of title if the purchaser had actual notice of them. [citations omitted]. Nonetheless, even where the remote grantee takes title with actual notice, the first two requirements - - that the covenant “touch and concern” the land and that the original parties intend the covenant to run - - must still be established." Id.
"Under Tennessee law, undated and unsigned writings located below the signatures and the certificate of acknowledgment in a deed do not constitute part of that deed. Anderson v. Howard, 74 S.W.2d 287, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934). To conclude otherwise would “open wide the door to the perpetration of fraud.” Id. But there is no dispute regarding the agreement between the Gambrells and Mr. Foshee at the time of the conveyance. The record makes clear that the language of the deed itself did not express the true intention of the parties. In his deposition, Mr. Foshee unequivocally stated that the terms of their contract included the restrictions, that he understood the restrictions would run with the land for thirty years, and that the list was attached to the deed and duly recorded. Despite the omission of encumbrances on the face of the Gambrell-Foshee deed, Mr. Foshee never believed his property to be unencumbered. Certainly, the undated, unsigned, and unacknowledged written covenants fail in form; however, the original covenanting parties confirmed their substance." Id.
This case involves the enforcement of restrictive covenants in equity. After subdividing their property, imposing restrictions on the three lots they sold, and retaining the remaining land, vendors brought suit against remote grantees to enforce the restrictive covenants and to enjoin them from operating a wedding chapel, for commercial use, on the land.
The central issue on appeal is whether the restrictions bind the remote grantees when the covenants were listed on an undated and unsigned attachment to a deed that neither identified encumbrances nor incorporated the attached restrictions. Following a trial on the matter, the trial court permanently enjoined the commercial activity because the remote grantees took title with actual notice of the restrictions. Finding ample support for the imposition of an equitable servitude, we concur in the trial court's judgment. Affirmed and remanded.
Cases available at the Tennessee Bar Association website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/gambrellj_022708.pdf
"[T]he Nivenses had actual notice of the restrictions. Generally, factual assertions contained in a deed bind the grantor and the grantee. Duke v. Hopper, 486 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). To assert estoppel, however, a party damaged by a false factual assertion must establish (1) its lack of knowledge, without fault, of the true facts, (2) its reliance upon the false factual assertion, and (3) its consequent action based upon that untrue statement. Id. ... They could not have reasonably relied on the face of the Gambrell-Foshee deed when they had actual notice of the restrictions." Id.
"An equitable servitude is a “covenant respecting the use of land enforceable against successor owners or possessors in equity regardless of its enforceability at law.” 2 American Law of Property § 9.31 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). ... For a covenant to bind remote grantees in equity, (1) it must “touch and concern” the land; (2) the original parties to the covenant must intend that it run with the land and bind remote grantees; and (3) the remote grantee must have had notice of the covenant. Id. at *1-*2 (quoting 5 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, The Law of Real Property § 673 (1991)). To have binding effect, valid restrictions on property need not be in the chain of title if the purchaser had actual notice of them. [citations omitted]. Nonetheless, even where the remote grantee takes title with actual notice, the first two requirements - - that the covenant “touch and concern” the land and that the original parties intend the covenant to run - - must still be established." Id.
"Under Tennessee law, undated and unsigned writings located below the signatures and the certificate of acknowledgment in a deed do not constitute part of that deed. Anderson v. Howard, 74 S.W.2d 287, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934). To conclude otherwise would “open wide the door to the perpetration of fraud.” Id. But there is no dispute regarding the agreement between the Gambrells and Mr. Foshee at the time of the conveyance. The record makes clear that the language of the deed itself did not express the true intention of the parties. In his deposition, Mr. Foshee unequivocally stated that the terms of their contract included the restrictions, that he understood the restrictions would run with the land for thirty years, and that the list was attached to the deed and duly recorded. Despite the omission of encumbrances on the face of the Gambrell-Foshee deed, Mr. Foshee never believed his property to be unencumbered. Certainly, the undated, unsigned, and unacknowledged written covenants fail in form; however, the original covenanting parties confirmed their substance." Id.
Description of real property in contract for sale failed to adequately define dimensions and was therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds
BRIGADOON PARTNERS, LLC v. DALE HUGHES, ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. February 27, 2008).
The plaintiff purchaser brought this action for specific performance of an agreement for the sale of a parcel of real estate. The trial court granted the seller summary judgment upon its finding, among other things, that the property description in the agreement was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. We affirm the trial court's judgment that the description of the property, which was to be divided from a larger tract owned by the seller, as "[i]n Cleveland, Tennessee, fronting on Paul Huff Pkwy at exit 27, and being further described as 1.5 acres fronting on the PKWY and I-75," was insufficient, and therefore the sale agreement was unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds.
Cases available at the Tennessee Bar Association website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/brigadoonpartners_022708.pdf
"As in Gorbics, the property description in the agreement in this case makes it possible to ascertain one definite corner of the property to be sold – the southwest corner – because the tract is said to front I-75 and the Paul Huff Parkway. But it is impossible to tell the shape or dimensions of the parcel, and to determine how much, if any, frontage on Ellis Circle Drive the parties intended to include in the sale, because, as in Gorbics, the parcel to be sold was to be divided from a larger tract owned by the sellers. The trial court so held, noting that “[t]here is an unlimited number of shapes that this property could in the defendants’ four acres2 that this Court is not at liberty to make decisions concerning.” Because “the description employed is one that must necessarily apply with equal exactness to any one of an indefinite number of tracts,” Dobson v. Litton, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) at 620, 1868 WL 2161 at *2, parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the parties intended to designate a particular tract by the description. Id." Id.
The plaintiff purchaser brought this action for specific performance of an agreement for the sale of a parcel of real estate. The trial court granted the seller summary judgment upon its finding, among other things, that the property description in the agreement was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. We affirm the trial court's judgment that the description of the property, which was to be divided from a larger tract owned by the seller, as "[i]n Cleveland, Tennessee, fronting on Paul Huff Pkwy at exit 27, and being further described as 1.5 acres fronting on the PKWY and I-75," was insufficient, and therefore the sale agreement was unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds.
Cases available at the Tennessee Bar Association website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/brigadoonpartners_022708.pdf
"As in Gorbics, the property description in the agreement in this case makes it possible to ascertain one definite corner of the property to be sold – the southwest corner – because the tract is said to front I-75 and the Paul Huff Parkway. But it is impossible to tell the shape or dimensions of the parcel, and to determine how much, if any, frontage on Ellis Circle Drive the parties intended to include in the sale, because, as in Gorbics, the parcel to be sold was to be divided from a larger tract owned by the sellers. The trial court so held, noting that “[t]here is an unlimited number of shapes that this property could in the defendants’ four acres2 that this Court is not at liberty to make decisions concerning.” Because “the description employed is one that must necessarily apply with equal exactness to any one of an indefinite number of tracts,” Dobson v. Litton, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) at 620, 1868 WL 2161 at *2, parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the parties intended to designate a particular tract by the description. Id." Id.
February 25, 2008
Cout finds implied terms of contract for construction of cable television system to be "same as or better" than existing system within six months
BOGGS KURLANDER STEELE, LLC V. HORIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (Tenn.Ct.App. February 22, 2008).
This appeal involves a declaratory judgment regarding the termination of a contract to install a cable system and provide cable service to a trailer park as well as a counter-complaint for damages. The trial court determined that the contract was properly terminated and dismissed the counter-complaint. On appeal, the Appellant argues that (1) the Appellee waived its contractual right to have this matter decided pursuant to Kentucky law; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that it materially breached the contract by failing to install a new system in a timely manner; (3) that the trial court erred in determining that it did not provide cable service equal to the service rendered by the former cable provider; (4) that the trial court erred in determining that the contract was properly terminated; (5) that it is entitled to damages because the Appellee failed to notify the Appellant with information about new residents as required by the contract; and (6) that the trial court erred by awarding the Appellee its attorney's fees and failing to award the Appellant its attorney's fees.
We find that the Appellee has waived its right to have this matter determined pursuant to Kentucky law. The trial court did not err in determining that the Appellant materially breached the contract by not providing cable service equal to the service previously provided and that the contract was properly terminated. Furthermore, we find that the Appellant is not entitled to damages because the Appellant did not prove what damages it incurred due to the Appellee's failure to provide the homes of new residents as required by the contract. Finally, the trial court did not err in awarding the Appellee's attorney's fees. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the award of Appellee's attorney's fees on appeal.
Opinion available at the Tennessee Bar Association website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/boggskurlandersteele_022208.pdf
"[T]he majority owner of Horizon testified that his company installed higher grade amplifers, replaced defective amplifiers, began replacing old cable with more appropriate cable and “it was made very clear that the old system would stay in place to ensure a smooth transition for when we did rebuild the system.” He further testified that to improve the signal quality, they decided to go to a digital system immediately and did so. Therefore, ... we find that the parties reasonably expected Horizon’s system to be the same as or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system. Thus, Horizon was required by the Contract to provide cable service equal to or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system." Id.
"Since the trial court found, without objection by either party, that six months was a reasonable time for the transition to take place, Horizon had six months from the date of the Contract to provide cable service equal to or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system, and Horizon breached the contract by not providing cable service that met that requirement. ... [W]e find that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Horizon did not provide cable service equal to or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system within the six month transition period. Thus, Horizon breached the Contract on December 26, 2003, six months after the date of the contract, and the breach was clearly material because cable television service was what the Contract was all about." Id.
This appeal involves a declaratory judgment regarding the termination of a contract to install a cable system and provide cable service to a trailer park as well as a counter-complaint for damages. The trial court determined that the contract was properly terminated and dismissed the counter-complaint. On appeal, the Appellant argues that (1) the Appellee waived its contractual right to have this matter decided pursuant to Kentucky law; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that it materially breached the contract by failing to install a new system in a timely manner; (3) that the trial court erred in determining that it did not provide cable service equal to the service rendered by the former cable provider; (4) that the trial court erred in determining that the contract was properly terminated; (5) that it is entitled to damages because the Appellee failed to notify the Appellant with information about new residents as required by the contract; and (6) that the trial court erred by awarding the Appellee its attorney's fees and failing to award the Appellant its attorney's fees.
We find that the Appellee has waived its right to have this matter determined pursuant to Kentucky law. The trial court did not err in determining that the Appellant materially breached the contract by not providing cable service equal to the service previously provided and that the contract was properly terminated. Furthermore, we find that the Appellant is not entitled to damages because the Appellant did not prove what damages it incurred due to the Appellee's failure to provide the homes of new residents as required by the contract. Finally, the trial court did not err in awarding the Appellee's attorney's fees. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the award of Appellee's attorney's fees on appeal.
Opinion available at the Tennessee Bar Association website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/boggskurlandersteele_022208.pdf
"[T]he majority owner of Horizon testified that his company installed higher grade amplifers, replaced defective amplifiers, began replacing old cable with more appropriate cable and “it was made very clear that the old system would stay in place to ensure a smooth transition for when we did rebuild the system.” He further testified that to improve the signal quality, they decided to go to a digital system immediately and did so. Therefore, ... we find that the parties reasonably expected Horizon’s system to be the same as or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system. Thus, Horizon was required by the Contract to provide cable service equal to or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system." Id.
"Since the trial court found, without objection by either party, that six months was a reasonable time for the transition to take place, Horizon had six months from the date of the Contract to provide cable service equal to or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system, and Horizon breached the contract by not providing cable service that met that requirement. ... [W]e find that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Horizon did not provide cable service equal to or better than Mr. Clinnard’s system within the six month transition period. Thus, Horizon breached the Contract on December 26, 2003, six months after the date of the contract, and the breach was clearly material because cable television service was what the Contract was all about." Id.
February 22, 2008
Fair rental value damages must not be "disproportionate, speculative, or unfair"
BEVERLY C. SMITH v. RONNIE R. SMITH ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. February 22, 2008).
Buyers of commercial property, who were denied possession of that property for a period of two years, appeal from the trial court's determination that they failed to carry their burden of proving a fair rental value for one of the three units of the property. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination, we reverse.
Opinion available at the Tennessee Bar Association website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/smithb_022208.pdf
"The unrebutted testimony of Ronnie Smith established a fair rental value of $600 per month for C Building. Moreover, the cancelled checks of Mr. Buckner supported Mr. Smith’s testimony concerning his current rental agreement with Mr. Buckner, which includes $600 in rent for C Building. The amount Ronnie Smith and Mr. Bucker agreed to in an arms-length transaction is at least some evidence of the rental value at the time of the breach. See BanccorpSouth, 223 S.W.2d at 231; Myer v. Whitacre, No. 01-A-01-9701-CH00014, 1997 WL 367483, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 1997). ... In this context, the $600 rental value for C Building does not seem disproportionate, speculative, or unfair." Id.
Buyers of commercial property, who were denied possession of that property for a period of two years, appeal from the trial court's determination that they failed to carry their burden of proving a fair rental value for one of the three units of the property. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination, we reverse.
Opinion available at the Tennessee Bar Association website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/smithb_022208.pdf
"The unrebutted testimony of Ronnie Smith established a fair rental value of $600 per month for C Building. Moreover, the cancelled checks of Mr. Buckner supported Mr. Smith’s testimony concerning his current rental agreement with Mr. Buckner, which includes $600 in rent for C Building. The amount Ronnie Smith and Mr. Bucker agreed to in an arms-length transaction is at least some evidence of the rental value at the time of the breach. See BanccorpSouth, 223 S.W.2d at 231; Myer v. Whitacre, No. 01-A-01-9701-CH00014, 1997 WL 367483, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 1997). ... In this context, the $600 rental value for C Building does not seem disproportionate, speculative, or unfair." Id.
February 21, 2008
Court takes the plain meaning of a homeowner's association declaration to find that developer's obligation to pay fees had not commenced
CORDOVA THE TOWN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GILL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 21, 2008).
This appeal involves the interpretation of a declaration of covenants for a homeowners’ association. The declaration made the developer a member of the homeowners’ association, insofar as the developer owned lots within the development. It also stated that the obligation to pay assessments on a given lot did not begin until either the lot was transferred from the developer or improvements on the lot were completed, whichever occurred first. The homeowners’ association sued the developer, seeking damages for unpaid assessments on lots owned by the developer, on which improvements were not complete. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the homeowners’ association. The developer appeals. We reverse, concluding that the declaration of covenants provides that the obligation to pay assessments on the lots owned by the developer had not yet commenced.
Opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/cordovat_091208.pdf
"Resolution of this dispute requires interpretation of the terms of the Declaration. At the outset, we note that our construction of the Declaration must proceed as would construction of any other written agreement. [] Accordingly, our first concern is the contracting parties’ mutual intent. [] If we find the Declaration to be unambiguous as it is written, the intention of the parties will be determined by the Declaration’s plain meaning. [] If a material part of the Declaration appears to be ambiguous, we look to extrinsic evidence. The ambiguity may be resolved against the party who drafted the Declaration." Id. (citations omitted).
"It is undisputed that the lots for which the assessments are sought are owned by Gill Development or were owned by Gill Development at one time. It is also undisputed that the improvements on those lots were incomplete at the time when the assessments were allegedly due. Accordingly, Gill Development’s obligation to pay assessments had not yet commenced." Id.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a declaration of covenants for a homeowners’ association. The declaration made the developer a member of the homeowners’ association, insofar as the developer owned lots within the development. It also stated that the obligation to pay assessments on a given lot did not begin until either the lot was transferred from the developer or improvements on the lot were completed, whichever occurred first. The homeowners’ association sued the developer, seeking damages for unpaid assessments on lots owned by the developer, on which improvements were not complete. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the homeowners’ association. The developer appeals. We reverse, concluding that the declaration of covenants provides that the obligation to pay assessments on the lots owned by the developer had not yet commenced.
Opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/cordovat_091208.pdf
"Resolution of this dispute requires interpretation of the terms of the Declaration. At the outset, we note that our construction of the Declaration must proceed as would construction of any other written agreement. [] Accordingly, our first concern is the contracting parties’ mutual intent. [] If we find the Declaration to be unambiguous as it is written, the intention of the parties will be determined by the Declaration’s plain meaning. [] If a material part of the Declaration appears to be ambiguous, we look to extrinsic evidence. The ambiguity may be resolved against the party who drafted the Declaration." Id. (citations omitted).
"It is undisputed that the lots for which the assessments are sought are owned by Gill Development or were owned by Gill Development at one time. It is also undisputed that the improvements on those lots were incomplete at the time when the assessments were allegedly due. Accordingly, Gill Development’s obligation to pay assessments had not yet commenced." Id.
Court looked to understandings between parties to a real estate transaction and awarded a prescriptive easement for access
WILLARD D. GORE, ET AL. v. TONY STOUT, ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 20, 2008)
This appeal involves a dispute between two landowners over use of a route across the defendants' land that the plaintiffs use for access to their nearby land. Plaintiffs filed suit contending they had a right to use the disputed route. The trial court determined that the route had been dedicated and accepted as a public road, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a prescriptive easement over the defendants' land, and that the plaintiffs had a right to use the road by adverse possession. We have determined that the contested section of the route is not a public road, that adverse possession does not apply, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a prescriptive easement over the defendants' land.
Opinion available at the Tennessee Bar Association website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/gorew_022008.pdf
"To establish a public road by implication, the proponent must satisfy two requirements. First, the landowner must intend to dedicate the road to the public. McCord v. Hays, 302 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tenn. 1957). Second, the public must expressly or impliedly accept the road. Id. The burden of proof is heavy. In short, the proponent must present 'proof of facts from which it positively and unequivocally appears that the owner intended to permanently part with his property and vest it in the public, and that there can be no other reasonable explanation of his conduct. In other words, dedication is a question of intention, and the intent must be clearly and satisfactorily proven.' ... Mr. Stout asked the county to gravel the entire length of the track. But this was just an attempt to get a little free work, to “gouge” the county as Mr. Stout put it. His intent was to save money, not to donate a road to the county. The county declined his request." Id. (quoting McKinney v. Duncan, 118 S.W. 683, 684 (Tenn. 1909)).
"An easement is an interest in another's real property that confers on the easement holder an enforceable right to use that real property for a specific use. Brew v. Van Deman, 53 Tenn. (6 Heisk.) 433, 436 (1871)). The most common form of an easement is a right of passage across another's property. Shew v. Bawgus, 227 S.W.3d 569, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). In Tennessee, easements can be created in several ways: (1) express grant, (2) reservation, (3) implication, (4) prescription, (5) estoppel, and (6) eminent domain. Pevear v. Hunt, 924 S.W.2d 114, 115-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). A prescriptive easement is an implied easement that is premised on the use of the property rather than language in a deed. Shew, 227 S.W.3d at 578. To create a prescriptive easement, the use and enjoyment of the property must be adverse, under a claim of right, continuous, uninterrupted, open, visible, exclusive, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement, and must continue for the full prescriptive period. Pevear, 924 S.W.2d at 116 (citing Keebler v. Street, 673 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. Ct, App. 1984). The proponent must prove each of the elements by “clear and convincing evidence.” Stone v. Buckley, 70 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). In Tennessee the prescriptive period is twenty years. Nashville Trust Co. v. Evans, 206 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947). ... All of this evidence – Johnson and Mr. Gore’s discussions, the fact that there is no other feasible access to Gore’s land, and their use of the route both before and after the sale – can only lead to one conclusion: Johnson and Gore had a parol understanding that Johnson was transferring the right to use the route." Id.
This appeal involves a dispute between two landowners over use of a route across the defendants' land that the plaintiffs use for access to their nearby land. Plaintiffs filed suit contending they had a right to use the disputed route. The trial court determined that the route had been dedicated and accepted as a public road, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a prescriptive easement over the defendants' land, and that the plaintiffs had a right to use the road by adverse possession. We have determined that the contested section of the route is not a public road, that adverse possession does not apply, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a prescriptive easement over the defendants' land.
Opinion available at the Tennessee Bar Association website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/gorew_022008.pdf
"To establish a public road by implication, the proponent must satisfy two requirements. First, the landowner must intend to dedicate the road to the public. McCord v. Hays, 302 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tenn. 1957). Second, the public must expressly or impliedly accept the road. Id. The burden of proof is heavy. In short, the proponent must present 'proof of facts from which it positively and unequivocally appears that the owner intended to permanently part with his property and vest it in the public, and that there can be no other reasonable explanation of his conduct. In other words, dedication is a question of intention, and the intent must be clearly and satisfactorily proven.' ... Mr. Stout asked the county to gravel the entire length of the track. But this was just an attempt to get a little free work, to “gouge” the county as Mr. Stout put it. His intent was to save money, not to donate a road to the county. The county declined his request." Id. (quoting McKinney v. Duncan, 118 S.W. 683, 684 (Tenn. 1909)).
"An easement is an interest in another's real property that confers on the easement holder an enforceable right to use that real property for a specific use. Brew v. Van Deman, 53 Tenn. (6 Heisk.) 433, 436 (1871)). The most common form of an easement is a right of passage across another's property. Shew v. Bawgus, 227 S.W.3d 569, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). In Tennessee, easements can be created in several ways: (1) express grant, (2) reservation, (3) implication, (4) prescription, (5) estoppel, and (6) eminent domain. Pevear v. Hunt, 924 S.W.2d 114, 115-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). A prescriptive easement is an implied easement that is premised on the use of the property rather than language in a deed. Shew, 227 S.W.3d at 578. To create a prescriptive easement, the use and enjoyment of the property must be adverse, under a claim of right, continuous, uninterrupted, open, visible, exclusive, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement, and must continue for the full prescriptive period. Pevear, 924 S.W.2d at 116 (citing Keebler v. Street, 673 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. Ct, App. 1984). The proponent must prove each of the elements by “clear and convincing evidence.” Stone v. Buckley, 70 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). In Tennessee the prescriptive period is twenty years. Nashville Trust Co. v. Evans, 206 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947). ... All of this evidence – Johnson and Mr. Gore’s discussions, the fact that there is no other feasible access to Gore’s land, and their use of the route both before and after the sale – can only lead to one conclusion: Johnson and Gore had a parol understanding that Johnson was transferring the right to use the route." Id.
February 02, 2008
Tennessee statute mandates that local governments contracting with "pure" construction managers must use competitive bidding and licensed contractors
Local Government Contracts With "Pure" Construction Managers
TN Attorney General Opinions
Date: 2008-02-01
Opinion Number: 08-16
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2008/ag_08_16.pdf
"Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-4-106(a)(1) does not prohibit local government contracts for 'pure' construction managers from being awarded based on competitive bids. ... Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-103(a)(1), any corporation engaged in contracting in Tennessee must be licensed as provided in the Contractors Licensing Act of 1994, Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-101, et seq. ... Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-7-107 does not authorize counties to contract with 'pure' construction managers without competitive bidding. Rather, that statute permits local governments to contract with construction managers to superintend construction projects." Id.
TN Attorney General Opinions
Date: 2008-02-01
Opinion Number: 08-16
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2008/ag_08_16.pdf
"Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-4-106(a)(1) does not prohibit local government contracts for 'pure' construction managers from being awarded based on competitive bids. ... Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-103(a)(1), any corporation engaged in contracting in Tennessee must be licensed as provided in the Contractors Licensing Act of 1994, Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-101, et seq. ... Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-7-107 does not authorize counties to contract with 'pure' construction managers without competitive bidding. Rather, that statute permits local governments to contract with construction managers to superintend construction projects." Id.
January 28, 2008
Get it in writing: a ledger entry plus testimony provides evidentiary basis to defeat claim of amendment of JV agreement to construct a home for sale
STINSON, INC. v. JOHNATHAN ANDREW COOK (Tenn.Ct.App. January 25, 2008).
The two parties to this appeal entered into a joint venture based upon an oral agreement, the purpose of which was to construct a house with the intent to sell the house on the open market. Unfortunately, no one agreed to purchase the house, and thus, pursuant to the venturers' oral agreement, the defendant purchased the house "at cost." The plaintiff sued the defendant contending it was entitled to an additional $30,000 based upon an alleged subsequent agreement by the defendant to purchase the lot upon which the house was constructed for $50,000 even though the plaintiff's cost to purchase the lot was $20,000. The trial court found the parties' agreement provided that the defendant would purchase the house and lot at cost, that the cost of the lot was $20,000, and that the defendant had paid the plaintiff all it was entitled to receive. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/cookj_012508.pdf
"And two times in this matter, the lot in question, 157, was shown of an actual cost of $20,000. It was shown on the oath of Mr. Stinson upon the transfer from Plantation Properties to Stinson, Incorporated, and it was shown on the Stinson job ledger sheet. And by a preponderance of the evidence, the cost of the lot was $20,000. ... As the foregoing reveals, the trial court found that the parties’ agreement provided that Cook would purchase the lot “at cost,” that the lot cost Stinson $20,000, and that Cook paid Stinson all of its costs, including $20,000 it was entitled to receive for the cost of the lot. Moreover, the court did not find that the parties had entered into a subsequent agreement or that they had amended their joint venture agreement." Id.
The two parties to this appeal entered into a joint venture based upon an oral agreement, the purpose of which was to construct a house with the intent to sell the house on the open market. Unfortunately, no one agreed to purchase the house, and thus, pursuant to the venturers' oral agreement, the defendant purchased the house "at cost." The plaintiff sued the defendant contending it was entitled to an additional $30,000 based upon an alleged subsequent agreement by the defendant to purchase the lot upon which the house was constructed for $50,000 even though the plaintiff's cost to purchase the lot was $20,000. The trial court found the parties' agreement provided that the defendant would purchase the house and lot at cost, that the cost of the lot was $20,000, and that the defendant had paid the plaintiff all it was entitled to receive. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/cookj_012508.pdf
"And two times in this matter, the lot in question, 157, was shown of an actual cost of $20,000. It was shown on the oath of Mr. Stinson upon the transfer from Plantation Properties to Stinson, Incorporated, and it was shown on the Stinson job ledger sheet. And by a preponderance of the evidence, the cost of the lot was $20,000. ... As the foregoing reveals, the trial court found that the parties’ agreement provided that Cook would purchase the lot “at cost,” that the lot cost Stinson $20,000, and that Cook paid Stinson all of its costs, including $20,000 it was entitled to receive for the cost of the lot. Moreover, the court did not find that the parties had entered into a subsequent agreement or that they had amended their joint venture agreement." Id.
January 21, 2008
The law of adverse possession and related legal doctrines are thoroughly examined in this court opinion
ROGER BALL and CARROL E. ROSE, LLC., v. BRUCE MCDOWELL, Individually and as Next Friend for D.B., C.B., B.B., Children under the age of Eighteen (18) years, PENNY CAYLOR, GARY ESTES, BRYAN KEITH BROCK, WARREN YONTS and PAULINE YONTS and JAMES D. YONTS (Tenn.Ct.App. January 18, 2008).
In this action, plaintiffs ask the Court to declare their easement across defendants' lands be cleared of all encroachments and that defendants be barred from interfering with their use. The Trial Court ruled for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal on the grounds they proved adverse possession of the easement for more than seven years, and plaintiffs are barred from interfering with their use by Tenn. Code Ann. section 28-2-103. We reverse the Trial Court's Judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/ballr_011808.pdf
"At trial, plaintiffs did not offer any evidence to rebut the testimony regarding the use of the 50 ft. easement. The Trial Court incorrectly applied the law, when it refused to find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28 - 2 - 103 barred plaintiffs’ cause of action. The Trial Court further erred when it found that there was no adverse possession because “the owner had no actual notice of the claim of adverse possession.” A showing of actual knowledge is not necessary if the possession is so open and notorious that there is an implied presumption of that fact. Kirkman v. Brown, 93 Tenn. 476, 27 S.W. 709, 710 (Tenn.1894). The evidence establishes defendants’ possession was open and notorious. Moreover, plaintiffs offered no testimony as to whether they were aware of the defendants’ activities or not." Id.
In this action, plaintiffs ask the Court to declare their easement across defendants' lands be cleared of all encroachments and that defendants be barred from interfering with their use. The Trial Court ruled for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal on the grounds they proved adverse possession of the easement for more than seven years, and plaintiffs are barred from interfering with their use by Tenn. Code Ann. section 28-2-103. We reverse the Trial Court's Judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/ballr_011808.pdf
"At trial, plaintiffs did not offer any evidence to rebut the testimony regarding the use of the 50 ft. easement. The Trial Court incorrectly applied the law, when it refused to find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28 - 2 - 103 barred plaintiffs’ cause of action. The Trial Court further erred when it found that there was no adverse possession because “the owner had no actual notice of the claim of adverse possession.” A showing of actual knowledge is not necessary if the possession is so open and notorious that there is an implied presumption of that fact. Kirkman v. Brown, 93 Tenn. 476, 27 S.W. 709, 710 (Tenn.1894). The evidence establishes defendants’ possession was open and notorious. Moreover, plaintiffs offered no testimony as to whether they were aware of the defendants’ activities or not." Id.
January 17, 2008
Simple tool doctrine is abolished because it is essentially a variation of the assumption of risk defense
CHARLES ROBERT BAGGETT v. BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE (Tenn.Ct.App. January 16, 2008).
This is a comparative negligence case. The plaintiff prisoner was incarcerated at the defendant county's jail. The inmates were given an opportunity to earn a reduction in their sentences by performing construction work to expand the jail's workhouse facility. The plaintiff volunteered for this program and was assigned the task of hanging cement board on the walls of the workhouse; the jail provided the plaintiff with a scaffold and a step ladder. The plaintiff was told to hang one of the boards at a height that could not be reached by standing on the scaffold alone. To perform the task, the plaintiff put the ladder on top of the scaffold and climbed the ladder. In doing so, he lost his balance, the scaffold collapsed, and he fell to the floor, sustaining serious injuries.
The plaintiff prisoner sued the county under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, seeking damages for his injuries. The county moved for summary judgment, asserting the simple tool doctrine and comparative negligence. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse, finding, inter alia, that the simple tool doctrine is a form of assumption of the risk and, as such, has been abolished in favor of comparative negligence.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/baggettc_011608.pdf
"The simple tool doctrine is clearly grounded in the principle of implied assumption of risk, unequivocally abolished in Perez. Because the simple tool doctrine is a variation of assumption of risk, we hold that it too must be considered abolished in favor of comparative negligence." Id.
This is a comparative negligence case. The plaintiff prisoner was incarcerated at the defendant county's jail. The inmates were given an opportunity to earn a reduction in their sentences by performing construction work to expand the jail's workhouse facility. The plaintiff volunteered for this program and was assigned the task of hanging cement board on the walls of the workhouse; the jail provided the plaintiff with a scaffold and a step ladder. The plaintiff was told to hang one of the boards at a height that could not be reached by standing on the scaffold alone. To perform the task, the plaintiff put the ladder on top of the scaffold and climbed the ladder. In doing so, he lost his balance, the scaffold collapsed, and he fell to the floor, sustaining serious injuries.
The plaintiff prisoner sued the county under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, seeking damages for his injuries. The county moved for summary judgment, asserting the simple tool doctrine and comparative negligence. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse, finding, inter alia, that the simple tool doctrine is a form of assumption of the risk and, as such, has been abolished in favor of comparative negligence.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2008/baggettc_011608.pdf
"The simple tool doctrine is clearly grounded in the principle of implied assumption of risk, unequivocally abolished in Perez. Because the simple tool doctrine is a variation of assumption of risk, we hold that it too must be considered abolished in favor of comparative negligence." Id.
December 27, 2007
Trial court believes construction company's testimony over homeowner; Reasonable opportunity to cure violated by prohibiting contractor from entering
DAVID LAVY d/b/a DL CONSTRUCTION v. JOAN CARROLL (Tenn.Ct.App. December 27, 2007).
This is a home construction case in which the homeowner appeals the trial court's decision finding her liable to the contractor for the amount remaining due under their original agreement as well as for subsequently authorized modifications. The homeowner contended below that the contractor's work was defective, but the trial court ruled that she was required to have given the contractor notice of any defects in his work and then afforded him a reasonable opportunity to cure these alleged deficiencies. On appeal, the homeowner argues that the trial court erred both in finding that she had not done this and in holding that these actions were required of her as a matter of law. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/lavyd_122707.pdf
"Mr. Lavy testified that he was prohibited from ever returning to Ms. Carroll’s property after the incident on January 22, 2005. Testimony from Mr. Underhill corroborated Mr. Lavy’s account of these events. Thus, there was certainly evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Mr. Lavy had not been provided a reasonable opportunity to cure. Put simply, the trial court believed Messrs. Lavy and Underhill rather than Ms. Waite. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we conclude that Ms. Carroll’s argument here is without merit." Id
"The trial court did not find that Mr. Lavy had been previously notified of any problems with his work, nor did it find that Mr. Lavy had ever refused to address any issues that had been brought to his attention. It did find, however, that, soon after he made his request for final payment, Ms. Carroll’s agents prohibited him from reentering the property. While Ms. Carroll contends that Mr. Lavy’s requesting payment and making filings with the Register of Deeds relieved her of the obligations imposed by McClain and Carter, she has failed to cite any law which would support this proposition. Likewise, the Court is unaware of any such authority. Filings under the lien law would have no effect on her duty to first give the contractor notice of the claimed defects and then allow him a reasonable opportunity to cure." Id
This is a home construction case in which the homeowner appeals the trial court's decision finding her liable to the contractor for the amount remaining due under their original agreement as well as for subsequently authorized modifications. The homeowner contended below that the contractor's work was defective, but the trial court ruled that she was required to have given the contractor notice of any defects in his work and then afforded him a reasonable opportunity to cure these alleged deficiencies. On appeal, the homeowner argues that the trial court erred both in finding that she had not done this and in holding that these actions were required of her as a matter of law. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/lavyd_122707.pdf
"Mr. Lavy testified that he was prohibited from ever returning to Ms. Carroll’s property after the incident on January 22, 2005. Testimony from Mr. Underhill corroborated Mr. Lavy’s account of these events. Thus, there was certainly evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Mr. Lavy had not been provided a reasonable opportunity to cure. Put simply, the trial court believed Messrs. Lavy and Underhill rather than Ms. Waite. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we conclude that Ms. Carroll’s argument here is without merit." Id
"The trial court did not find that Mr. Lavy had been previously notified of any problems with his work, nor did it find that Mr. Lavy had ever refused to address any issues that had been brought to his attention. It did find, however, that, soon after he made his request for final payment, Ms. Carroll’s agents prohibited him from reentering the property. While Ms. Carroll contends that Mr. Lavy’s requesting payment and making filings with the Register of Deeds relieved her of the obligations imposed by McClain and Carter, she has failed to cite any law which would support this proposition. Likewise, the Court is unaware of any such authority. Filings under the lien law would have no effect on her duty to first give the contractor notice of the claimed defects and then allow him a reasonable opportunity to cure." Id
"Virgin" land surveys may trump multiple prior surveys based on the same inaccuracy
RALPH DAVIS, ET AL. v. DANIEL CUEL, ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. December 27, 2007).
In this boundary line dispute, Ralph Davis and his wife Jackie Davis ("the Davises") sued Daniel Cuel and Francine Cuel ("the Cuels"), alleging that the Cuels had improperly claimed a portion of the Davises' property as their own. Existing surveys supported the Cuels' claim, but the Davises asserted that a prior agreement gave them the right to an additional 0.42-acre tract ("the southern disputed area") on the Cuels' side of the survey boundary. The Cuels, meanwhile, believed that they were entitled to more land than the existing surveys indicated, so they hired a surveyor, Dave Bruce, to conduct a new survey ("the Bruce survey"). The Bruce survey indicated that the Cuels are entitled not only to the southern disputed area, but also to an additional area north of it ("the northern disputed area"), on what the earlier surveys had regarded as the Davises' side. The Bruce survey further indicated that an additional tract claimed by the Davises, immediately north of the northern disputed area, is actually a county right-of-way.
The trial court adopted the Bruce survey and awarded both the northern and southern disputed areas to the Cuels. As a consequence of this ruling, the Davises, the plaintiffs in this case, actually end up with less land than they started with. They appeal, claiming that the evidence preponderates against the court's factual findings, and also that they should have prevailed on a theory of estoppel or acquiescence. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the court's findings, and, even assuming that the Davises did not waive their alternative theories of recovery at trial, the evidence does not support those theories. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/davisr_122707.pdf
"Disregarding the deposition, we find no merit in the Davises’ claim that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The Davises note that the Bruce survey contradicts four earlier surveys, including Mr. Crutchfield’s, which all showed the boundary line at the same place. However, as noted earlier, Mr. Bruce testified that his was a “virgin” survey, and the court was entitled to credit it over the prior, non-virgin surveys; the number of previous surveys reaching a contrary conclusion certainly does not create a preponderance where those earlier surveys were, according to testimony that the court was entitled to accept, all built upon one another. Similarly, it is not dispositive that the parties’ own deeds lack any reference to the right-of-way that the Bruce survey defines as the boundary. The testimony indicated that Mr. Bruce relied on documents which pre-dated those deeds, including deeds that preceded them in the chains of title. The court was entitled to believe that the “virgin” Bruce survey, based in part on early deeds and tax maps that Mr. Crutchfield did not consider, more accurately describes the boundary in question than the Crutchfield “retracing” survey does." Id.
In this boundary line dispute, Ralph Davis and his wife Jackie Davis ("the Davises") sued Daniel Cuel and Francine Cuel ("the Cuels"), alleging that the Cuels had improperly claimed a portion of the Davises' property as their own. Existing surveys supported the Cuels' claim, but the Davises asserted that a prior agreement gave them the right to an additional 0.42-acre tract ("the southern disputed area") on the Cuels' side of the survey boundary. The Cuels, meanwhile, believed that they were entitled to more land than the existing surveys indicated, so they hired a surveyor, Dave Bruce, to conduct a new survey ("the Bruce survey"). The Bruce survey indicated that the Cuels are entitled not only to the southern disputed area, but also to an additional area north of it ("the northern disputed area"), on what the earlier surveys had regarded as the Davises' side. The Bruce survey further indicated that an additional tract claimed by the Davises, immediately north of the northern disputed area, is actually a county right-of-way.
The trial court adopted the Bruce survey and awarded both the northern and southern disputed areas to the Cuels. As a consequence of this ruling, the Davises, the plaintiffs in this case, actually end up with less land than they started with. They appeal, claiming that the evidence preponderates against the court's factual findings, and also that they should have prevailed on a theory of estoppel or acquiescence. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the court's findings, and, even assuming that the Davises did not waive their alternative theories of recovery at trial, the evidence does not support those theories. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/davisr_122707.pdf
"Disregarding the deposition, we find no merit in the Davises’ claim that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The Davises note that the Bruce survey contradicts four earlier surveys, including Mr. Crutchfield’s, which all showed the boundary line at the same place. However, as noted earlier, Mr. Bruce testified that his was a “virgin” survey, and the court was entitled to credit it over the prior, non-virgin surveys; the number of previous surveys reaching a contrary conclusion certainly does not create a preponderance where those earlier surveys were, according to testimony that the court was entitled to accept, all built upon one another. Similarly, it is not dispositive that the parties’ own deeds lack any reference to the right-of-way that the Bruce survey defines as the boundary. The testimony indicated that Mr. Bruce relied on documents which pre-dated those deeds, including deeds that preceded them in the chains of title. The court was entitled to believe that the “virgin” Bruce survey, based in part on early deeds and tax maps that Mr. Crutchfield did not consider, more accurately describes the boundary in question than the Crutchfield “retracing” survey does." Id.
Use of a product manufacturer's literature in a contract does not establish agency; Employee's use of "we" and "us" may not be used to pierce the veil
CHARLES BURNETTE, ET AL. v. THE ESTATE OF RICHARD GUIDER, ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. December 27, 2007).
Charles Burnette and Imogene Burnette ("Homeowners") allege that their driveway was damaged as a result of the faulty repair work of Concrete Maintenance Specialists ("CMS"), a company that employed, among others, Brian Cupp ("Cupp"). The repairs by CMS made use of a product sold by Fischl Enterprises, Inc., aka Lone Star Epoxies ("Lone Star"). Art Fischl is the principal of this corporation. No defect in the product is alleged, only a faulty installation by employees of CMS. Homeowners sued CMS, Cupp, Lone Star and several others (collectively "Defendants") seeking damages, claiming that CMS is directly liable, Lone Star is liable because CMS was its agent, and Cupp is liable because CMS's corporate veil should be pierced and Cupp is a principal of CMS. Cupp and Lone Star each filed a motion for summary judgment. Cupp argues that he was only an employee of CMS, not a principal, and thus could not be liable even if CMS's corporate veil were pierced. Lone Star argues that CMS was not its agent. The trial court granted both motions. Homeowners appeal, arguing that they successfully demonstrated the existence of material factual disputes regarding the issues pertaining to Cupp and Lone Star, and also that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment before ruling on Homeowners' motion to compel. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/burnettec_122707.pdf
"King states that “[m]uch of the technical information and some of the marketing information utilized by CMS were actually Lone Star documents which CMS used replacing the name ‘Lone Star Epoxies’ with the name ‘Concrete Maintenance Specialists’ which gave the impression that the products were actually CMS products.” This statement fails to help Homeowners because it does not allege that Lone Star played any role in altering the documents, which would be necessary to establish that they were representations or conduct of the purported principal rather than of the purported agent. In addition, the foundation of King’s statement is unclear, and she does not allege that the documents were actually used to make representations to Homeowners, only that the documents existed. This is clearly inadequate to create a disputed issue of material fact on the issue of apparent agency." Id.
"The affidavit of Burnette, one of the homeowner plaintiffs, states that he “was informed by Brian Cupp that he managed employees and supervised work such that he gave orders to perform certain work on my driveway[.]” Burnette further quotes Cupp as making various statements about CMS using words like “we” and “our.” To bolster this argument, Homeowners point to a lengthy transcript of a recorded telephone conversation between Burnette and Cupp. Homeowners argue in their brief that Cupp’s statements to Burnette are evidence that Cupp “held himself out as a person with management authority.” This they may be, but they are not evidence that he is a principal of the company. A mere employee may exercise “management authority,” and certainly may refer to his employer as “we” or “us.” An employee may also promise that his employer company will get work done by a date certain, and he may order subordinate employees to do the work. None of these actions suggest principal status. To hold Cupp liable on a veil-piercing theory, Homeowners needed to provide evidence that he is not merely a “person with management authority” of an alleged “joint family venture,” but that he is a principal, shareholder, officer or director of the company, whatever its corporate status. This they have failed to do." Id.
Charles Burnette and Imogene Burnette ("Homeowners") allege that their driveway was damaged as a result of the faulty repair work of Concrete Maintenance Specialists ("CMS"), a company that employed, among others, Brian Cupp ("Cupp"). The repairs by CMS made use of a product sold by Fischl Enterprises, Inc., aka Lone Star Epoxies ("Lone Star"). Art Fischl is the principal of this corporation. No defect in the product is alleged, only a faulty installation by employees of CMS. Homeowners sued CMS, Cupp, Lone Star and several others (collectively "Defendants") seeking damages, claiming that CMS is directly liable, Lone Star is liable because CMS was its agent, and Cupp is liable because CMS's corporate veil should be pierced and Cupp is a principal of CMS. Cupp and Lone Star each filed a motion for summary judgment. Cupp argues that he was only an employee of CMS, not a principal, and thus could not be liable even if CMS's corporate veil were pierced. Lone Star argues that CMS was not its agent. The trial court granted both motions. Homeowners appeal, arguing that they successfully demonstrated the existence of material factual disputes regarding the issues pertaining to Cupp and Lone Star, and also that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment before ruling on Homeowners' motion to compel. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/burnettec_122707.pdf
"King states that “[m]uch of the technical information and some of the marketing information utilized by CMS were actually Lone Star documents which CMS used replacing the name ‘Lone Star Epoxies’ with the name ‘Concrete Maintenance Specialists’ which gave the impression that the products were actually CMS products.” This statement fails to help Homeowners because it does not allege that Lone Star played any role in altering the documents, which would be necessary to establish that they were representations or conduct of the purported principal rather than of the purported agent. In addition, the foundation of King’s statement is unclear, and she does not allege that the documents were actually used to make representations to Homeowners, only that the documents existed. This is clearly inadequate to create a disputed issue of material fact on the issue of apparent agency." Id.
"The affidavit of Burnette, one of the homeowner plaintiffs, states that he “was informed by Brian Cupp that he managed employees and supervised work such that he gave orders to perform certain work on my driveway[.]” Burnette further quotes Cupp as making various statements about CMS using words like “we” and “our.” To bolster this argument, Homeowners point to a lengthy transcript of a recorded telephone conversation between Burnette and Cupp. Homeowners argue in their brief that Cupp’s statements to Burnette are evidence that Cupp “held himself out as a person with management authority.” This they may be, but they are not evidence that he is a principal of the company. A mere employee may exercise “management authority,” and certainly may refer to his employer as “we” or “us.” An employee may also promise that his employer company will get work done by a date certain, and he may order subordinate employees to do the work. None of these actions suggest principal status. To hold Cupp liable on a veil-piercing theory, Homeowners needed to provide evidence that he is not merely a “person with management authority” of an alleged “joint family venture,” but that he is a principal, shareholder, officer or director of the company, whatever its corporate status. This they have failed to do." Id.
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